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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATLANTA DIVISION
GEGE ODION,

Plaintifl

CIVIL ACTION
No. 1:13-cv-03906-SCT

GOOGLE INC., et al.,
Defendants.

ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Defendants Branch Banking and Trust
Company's, BB&T krvestment Services, Inc.'s, Atlas GA

II

SPE, LLC's, Sharon

Silvermintz's, and Nancy H. Baughan's (collectively, the "BB&T Defendants',)
Motion to Dismiss [Doc. No. 33], Defendants T. Matthew Mashburn's and Stites &
Harbisory PLLC's Motion to Dismiss [Doc. No. 45], Defendants James p. Blum, Jr.,s
and Beloin, Browry Blum, LLC's Motion to Dismiss [Doc. No.46], DefendantJudge

Cynthia D. Wright's Motion to Dismiss [Doc. No.47], Defendants Tej K. Kaul's and
Consulting Enterprises Corporation's (collectively, the "Consulting Defendants,,)

Motion to Dismiss [Doc. No. 49], Defendant Google Inc.'s Motion to Dismiss [Doc.
No. 53], Defendants Clay Weibel's and Weibel & Associates, Inc.'s (collectively, the

"Weibel Defendants") Motion to Dismiss [Doc. No. 56], Defendants Cathy Lyon,s
and Amy Abrames'Motionto Dismiss [Doc. No.58], Defendants GilChaimVaron,s,
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the Law Office of Gil Chaim Varon, LLC's and Highshore Medical Center, LLC's

Motion to Dismiss [Doc. No. 65], Defendants Darryl Moss' and Weissmary Nowack,

Curry & Wilco, P.C.'s Motion to Dismiss [Doc. No. 671, the Weibel Defendants'
Motion for Sanctions [Doc. No. 99], Plaintiff Gege Odion's ("Plaintiff") Request for
Notice of Motion for Sanction [Doc. No. 92], Plaintiffs' Motion for Sanctions [Doc.
No. 111], Plaintiffs' Motion for Extension of Time to File Response to Defendants'

Motion to Dismiss [Doc. No. 60], Defendants Google Inc.'s, the BB&T Defendants',
the Consulting Defendants', the Weibel Defendants', T. Matthew Mashburn

&Harbisory PLLC's,James

P.

s,

Stites

Blum,Jr.'s, Beloin,Brown, BIum, LLC's,CathyLyort's,

and Amy Abrames'Joint Motion for Status Conference [Doc. No. 9L], Defendant

Google Inc.'s Motion for Leave to File Sur-Reply [Doc. No. 109], the Consulting
Defendants' Motion to Stay [Doc. No. 115], the Weibel Defendants' Motion to Strike

Plaintiffs' Sur-Reply [Doc. No. 116], Defendant Google Inc.'s Motion to Strike
Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment [Doc. No. 119], Defendant Judge
Cynthia D. Wright's Motion for Extension of Time to Respond to Plaintiffs' Motion
for Partial Summary Judgment [Doc. No. L20], the Consulting Defendants' Motion

to Strike Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment [Doc. No. 130],
Defendants Cathy Lyon's and Amy Abrames'Motion for

a

Stay of the Deadline to
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Respond to Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment [Doc. No. 131], the

Consulting Defendants' Motion Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d)
[Doc. No. 134], and Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File Excess Pages [Doc. No. 142].

For the reasons explained in this order, the aforementioned motions to dismiss are

GRANTED, the aforementioned motions for sanctions are DENIED, and the
remaining motions are DISMISSED AS MOOT.

I.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, proc eedingpro

se,

iritiated this action on November 25, 2013, naming

30 different defendants in his complaint [Doc. No. 1, 1].1 In general,

Plaintiff alleges

in his complaint that Defendants collectively engaged in the fraudulent acquisition
and conveyance of properties located at "2851 Candler; 2855 Candler, 2849 Candler

and 2956 S. Rainbow Drive" [Doc. No. 1, 11]. Plaintiff further alleges that
Defendants hacked into his and his businesses' computer systems and stole emails
and data that contained "related evidence of [Defendants'] illegal schemes" [ld. at
141. Plaintiff's complaint

further alleges that Defendants have engaged in

1 Plaintiff
also attempts to bring his claims on behalf of Siris Property Management, LLC
and Optiworld Vision Center. However, both business companies are considered to be
artificial entities and, therefore, cannot appear in federal court pro se. see Palazzo o. Gulf oil
Corp.,764F.2d1381, 1385 (11th Cir. 1985) (stating that business entities "cannor a ppear pro
se, and must be represented by counsel."). As a result, the undersigned construes Plaintiff's
complaint to assert claims only on his own behalf.
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"racketeering and conspiracy," "fraudulent mortgage activities," and "fraudulent
financial transactions" [id. at 14, 76].

In lieu of filing an answer, every Defendant who has entered this case has

filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6). Additionallp the Weibel Defendants have filed a motion for
sanctions against Plaintiff pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(b)-(c) [Doc.

No. 99,2]. Plaintiff has also filed two motions for sanctions against the Consulting
Defendants and their attorney W. Hensell Harris, Jr. ("Mr. Harris") regarding the

content of the Consulting Defendant's motion to dismiss. Further, as a result of

Plaintiffs' voluminous filings as well as the number of Defendants in this action,
several other motions are currently pending before the Court. However, many of
these motions are contingent on the Court's

ruling on the pending motions to

dismiss.
Below, the Court addresses the aforementioned motions currently pending

in this action.

-4-
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IL

DEFENDANTS'MOTIONS TO DISMISS

A.

Legal Standard

A complaint may be dismissed under a Rule 12(b)(5) motion to dismiss if the
facts as pled do not state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. Ashcroft

a.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009) (explaining "only a complaint that states a plausible

claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss."); Bell Atlantic Corp, a. Twombly,550
U.S. 544,561-62,570 (2007) (retiring the prior Conley a. Gibson,355 U.S. 41,45-46
(1957), standard which provided

thatinreviewingthe sufficiency of acomplaint, the

complaint should notbe dismissed "unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff
can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.").

In lqbal, the Supreme Court reiterated that although Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure does not require detailed factual allegations, it does demand "more
than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Iqbal,556
U.S. at 678.

InTwombly, the Supreme Court emphasized
labels and conclusions, and

will not do."

a

a

complaint "requires more than

formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action

550 U.S. at 555. Factual allegations in a complaint need not be detailed

but "must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the

-5-
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assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in
fact)." Id. at 555 (internal citations and emphasis omitted).

B.

Discussion

Again, all of the Defendants who have entered this case have filed motions to
dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). while including several individualized defenses,

all of these motions argue that Plaintiff

s

complaint fails to state

a

claim upon which

relief can be granted. Therefore, in regards to whether or not Plaintiffs' complaint
satisfies the plausibility pleadingstandardestablished undet lqbalandrwombly,the

Court considers the Defendants' pending motions to dismiss collectively.2

' At the outse! the Court notes that there are obvious deficiencies in Plaintiff's
individualized claims. For example, Plaintiff asserts several claims under Title 18.
However, as a general matter, "Title 18 is a federal criminal statute which does not create
civil liability or a private right of action." Morrell a. Lunceford, civil Action No. 09-00753KD-C, 2011 WL 4025725, at *6 (S.D. Ala. Aug. 18,2011) (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted). Therefore, several of Plaintiff s Title 18 claims are invalid in this civil action
as a matter of law. As another example, Plaintiff asserts a claim of negligence under
Georgia state law against all Defendants. under Georgia law. "[t]he essential elements of
negligence claim are the existence of a legal duty; breach of that duty; a causal connection
between the defendant's conduct and the plaintiff,s injury; and damages." Ceasar u. Wells
a

Bank,N.A.,322Ga. App.529,533,7445.8.2d369,373(2013).Inhis complaint, plaintiff
only recites the elements of a negligence claim, stating, for example, that " defendants owed
legal duties of care to Plaintiff[]" [Doc. No. 1,34]. However, Plaintiff does not establish
what legal duty each Defendant had to him, or how that duty was breached. Therefore,
Plaintiff only pleads the elements of a negligence claim and, therefore, fails to plead said
claim sufficiently. Similar deficiencies exist regarding the rest of Plaintiffs individual
claims. However, for the sake of brevity, the Court will not discuss the deficiencies
regarding each of Plaintiff's 21 claims as they relate to each of the 22 Defendants who have
filed a motion to dismiss. Instead, the Court addresses whether or not the allegations on
Fargo

-6-
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In his complaint, Plaintiff asserts 21 individual claims. In support of these
claims, Plaintiffs make generalized allegations that "Defendants" have engaged in

"fraudulent acquisition and conveyance of propertie s" fid. at11,l, stole certain data

and information by hacking into Plaintiffs computer system, engaged in
"racketeering and conspiracy" lid. at 14], and "engaged in fraudulent financial
transactions and swindles" [id. at1,6]. However, Plaintiff does not actually provide
facts that support these allegations. Further, Plaintiff does not allege how and when

"Defendants" committed these improper acts, let alone the role that each Defendant

played in said acts. Without such facts, Plaintiffs' allegations simply amount to
nothing more than improper legal conclusions. More to the point, Plaintiffs' baseless
allegations are a prime example of the type of meritless accusations the
Iqbal decisions seek to prevent.

See

Tar ombly

and

lqbal,556 U.S. at 678 (stating "the tenet that

court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint

a

is

inapplicable to legal conclusions."). In summary, Plaintiff does not present a set of

which Plaintiff's claims are based are sufficiently plausible under the established pleading
standard. Obviously, ifPlaintiff's underlying allegations are not sufficiently plausible then
all of his claims would fail to survive Defendants' respective motions to dismiss. As a
result, the Court addresses Plaintiff s claims regarding each of the Defendants who have
fiied a motion to dismiss coliectivelv.
-7-
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factual allegations that even suggests, let alone establishes, his claims are facially
plausible.
The undersigned also notes that "determining whether a complaint states a

plausible claim is context-specific, requiring the reviewing court to draw on its
experienceandcommonsense." lqbal,556LJ.S.at663-64.Basedonthisstandard,the
undersigned deems that Plaintiff's complaint is nonsensical and ripe for dismissal
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). In no way can the undersigned assume, based on nothing
more than

a

conclusory allegatiory that the 30 entities named as Defendants, several

of which appear to have no relationship whatsoever, conspired together to hack

into

Plaintiff's computer system and steal certain undefined information. Again, such a
far-fetched accusation that is not supported by a shred of factual detail is precisely

the type of allegation that the Iqbal to Twombly decisions seek to prevent. The
undersigned will notwaste this Court's time and resources indulging such

a

facially

deficient complaint.3

Further, Plaintiffs' complaint appears to focus on the generalized allegation
that Defendants have perpetrated fraud in order to acquire and convey property

'

This rationale is also applicable to Plaintiff s allegations of racketeering and conspiracy.
Again, Plaintiff makes no effort to articulate how Defendants are connected to one another,
let alone how they acted in concert regarding their alleged misconduct of "racketeering"
and "conspiracy."

-8-
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located at"285lCandler;2855 Candler,2849 Candler and2956 S. Rainbow Drive"
[Doc. No. 1, 11]. Therefore, with respect to this fraud allegation, Plaintiffs' complaint

must not only include sufficient factual allegations to satisfy the plausibility
standard of Rule12(b)(6), it must also satisfy the heightened pleading requirements
established under Rule 9(b). To properly allege fraud under Rule 9(b), a plaintiff

"must state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake." Fed.
R. Civ. P. 9(b). To satisfy this particularity requirement of Rule 9(b), a plaintiff's

complaint "must include facts as to time, place, and substance of the defendant,s
alleged fraud." United States ex

rel

Clausen a. Lab. Corp. of Am., Inc.,290 F.gd 1901,

1308 (11th Cir.2002) (citation omitted);

see

also Llnited States ex rel. Matheny o. Medco

Health Solutions, Inc., 671. F.3d 1217, 7222 (l1th Cir. 2012) ("The parricularity
requirement of Rule 9(b) is satisfied if the complaint alleges facts as to time, place,

and substance of the defendant's alleged fraud, specifically the details of the
defendants' allegedly fraudulent acts, when they occurred, and who engaged in

them.") (internal quotations and citation omitted).

In support of his fraudulent acquisition and conveyance of

property

allegation, Plaintiff only alleges that Defendants "devised a scheme to defraud
Plaintiff of money and property by means of fraudulent representations" [Doc. No.

-9-
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1, 18]. In addressing how this fraud was perpetrated, Plaintiff only asserts that

"Defendants used the U.S. Postal Service andf or private or commercial interstate
carriers"

[id.

].

Obviously, such an assertion does not properly allege the time, place,

and substance of the fraudulent acts that Defendants allegedly committed. More

importantly, Plaintiff does not allege with specificity the role each particular
Defendant played in each individualized act of fraud. [n short, Plaintiff does not

sufficiently distinguish the Defendants in regards to who actually committed the
alleged acts of fraud. As a general rule, when a plaintiff claims fraud by several
defendants, "the complaint should contain specific allegations with respect to each

defendan! generalized allegations 'lumping' multiple defendants together are
insufficient." W. Coast Roofng

I

App'x 81, 86 (11th Cir. 2008);

also Brooks tt. BIue Cross €t Blue Shield of FIa., 1nc.,11.6

F3d

1364, 1381 (11th

see

Waterproofng, lnc. a. lohns Manaille, Inc.,287 F.

Cir. 1997) ("Because fair notice is perhaps the most basic

consideration underlying Rule

9(b) . . the plaintiff who pleads fraud must

reasonably notify the defendants

of their purported role in the scheme.")

(alterations, internal quotations, and citation omitted). By failing to articulate when

each fraudulent act occurred, and each Defendant's role

-10-

in committing

each
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fraudulent act, Plaintiffs' complaint does not satisfy the heightened particularity
pleading standard of Rule 9(b).
In summary, Plaintiffs' complaint does not allege facts that suggest his claims

against Defendants are plausible. Further, to the extent certain claims asserted by

Plaintiffs rest on the allegation of fraud, such claims additionally fail to satisfy the
particularity standard of Rule 9(b). Based on these deficiencies, Plaintiffs' complaint
cannot survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Accordingly, to the extent they

request a dismissal of Plaintiffs' complaint a the BB&T Defendants' Motion to
Dismiss [Doc. No. 33], T. Matthew Mashbum's and Stites

& Harbison, PLLC's

Motion to Dismiss [Doc. No. 45], James P. Blum, Jr.'s and Beloin, Brown, Blum,
LLC's Motion to Dismiss [Doc. No. 46], Judge Cynthia D. Wright's Motion to
Dismiss [Doc. No.47], the Consulting Defendants' Motion to Dismiss [Doc. No.49],
Google Inc.'s Motion to Dismiss [Doc. No. 53], the Weibel Defendants' Motion to
Dismiss [Doc. No. 56], Cathy Lyon s and Amy Abrames' Motion to Dismiss [Doc.

*

The undersigned acknowledges that several Defendants request in their respective
motions to dismiss that this Court impose a restriction on Plaintiff regarding any future
filings. While acknowledging Plaintiff's obviously litigious nature, the undersigned does
not believe such a formal restriction is necessary at this time, as this action appears to be
Plaintiff's first fiiing in federal court. However, pursuant to the aforementioned
Defendants' motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), this action has been dismissed on the
merits. Therefore, Plaintiff is put on notice that any further litigation involving these same
parties, allegations, and claims in this Court will potentially subject him to sanctions.
-11-
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No.

581,

Gil Chaim Varon's, the Law Office of Gil Chaim Varon, LLC's and

Highshore Medical Center, LLC's Motion to Dismiss [Doc. No. 65], and Darryl
Moss' and Weissman, Nowack, Curry & Wilco, P.C.'s Motion to Dismiss [Doc. No.
67

I

III.

are hereby GRANTED.5

THE WEIBEL DEFENDANTS'MOTION FOR SANCTIONS

A.

Legal Standard

Rule 11(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure prohibits parties from

filing

or pursuing frivolous claims. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b). Sanctions under Rule 11 are
proper "(1) when a party files a pleading that has no reasonable factual basis; (2)
when the party files

a

pleading that

is based on a

legal theory that has no reasonable

chance of success and that cannot be advanced as a reasonable argument to change

existing law; or (3) when the party files a pleading in bad faith for an improper
purpose.'/ Worldwide Primates, Inc. tt. McGreal, 87 F.3d 1252, 1254 (11th Cir. 1996)

(qrottngloneso.lnt'l RidingHelmets,Ltd.,49F.3d692,694 (11th Cir. 1995)). If a court
determines Rule 11(b) has been violated, Rule 11(c) allows the court to "impose an

appropriate sanction on any attomey, law firm, or party that violated the rule or is

s As

it determines Plaintiff's complaint fails to properly plead a claim for relief under Rule
12(b)(6) and Rule 9(b), the Court does not need to address the other arguments for
dismissal maintained in Defendants' respective motions to dismiss.
1a
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responsible for the violation." Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(1). As part of the appropriate
sanction allowed under Rule 11(c), a court may order a party to pay "part or all of

the reasonable attorneyrs fees and other expenses directly resulting from the
violation." Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(a).
ln analyzing Rule 11, the objective standard for testing alleged misconduct
is "reasonableness under the circumstances" and "what was reasonable [for the
attorneyl to believe at the time" he submitted his pleading. Baker a. Alderman,l1g
F.3d 516, 524 (11.rh Cir. 1998) (citation omitted). Therefore, the Eleventh Circuit
requires the following two-step inquiry in addressing

a

motion for sanctions under

Rule 11: " (1) whether the partSr's claims are objectively frivolous; and (2) whether the

person who signed the pleadings should have been aware that they were frivolous."

Id. "Although sanctions are warranted when the claimant exhibits a deliberate
indifference to obvious facts, they are not warranted when the claimant's evidence
is merely weak but appears sufficient, after a reasonable

inquiry, to support a claim

under existing law." Id. (internal quotations and citation omitted).

B.

Discussion

In their motiory the Weibel Defendants argue that Plaintiffs should

be

sanctioned under Rule 11 because he "knew [his] claims were barred by res judicata

-13-
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at the time [he] filed them" [Doc. No. 99, 2]. Specifically, the Weibel Defendants
argue that Plainti{fs claims are barred due to a case involving themselves and

Plaintiff that was dismissed by the Superior Court of DeKalb County, Georgia (the
"DeKalb action"). Therefore, the Court must determine if Plaintiffs' complaint, as
it relates to the Weibel Defendants, is barred by the doctrine of res judicata.

"In considering whether to give preclusive effect to state-court judgments
under res judicata or collateral estoppel, the federal court must apply the rendering
state's law of preclusion." CmU.State Banka. Strong,651 F.3d 7241.,1263 (11th Cir.
2011). Under Georgia law, both res judicata and collateral estoppel only apply when

the claims or issues have been previously adjudicated on the merits. Karan, Inc. a.

Auto-OwnersIns. Co.,280Ga.545,54647,6295.8.2d260,262-63 (2006).ln the DeKalb

action, Plaintiff attempted to add the Weibel Defendants as parties through an
amended complaint [Doc. No. 99-2,4-5]. However, the Superior Court determined
that, because Plaintiff did not seek leave of court to add a new party as required by
O.C.G.A.

S

9-11-21 before filing his amended

complaint the Weibel Defendants were

not properly joined to the DeKalb action [ld. at 5]. Therefore, as they were not
actually parties, the Superior Court determined that Plainti{f's claims against the
Weibel Defendants in the DeKalb action were effectively moot.

-1,4-
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As they were not actually defendants, the claims against Weibel Defendants

in the DeKalb action were not dismissed on the merits. The undersigned
acknowledges that the court in the DeKalb action provided an altemative analysis,
stating that even if the weibel Defendants were properly added the claims against

them would be dismissed pursuant to O.C.G.A.

S

9-11-12(b)(6) [ld.]. However, as

they were not actually defendants in the DeKalb action, the undersigned must
construe this alternative analysis as dicta. As it was not dismissed on the merits in
regards to the Weibel Defendants, the DeKalb action does not provide a basis to

apply the res judicata doctrine to Plaintif(s claims against the Weibel Defendants in
this action. Accordingly, the Weibel Defendants' MotionforSanctions [Doc. No. 99]
is hereby DENIED.

Iv,

PLAINTIFF'S MOTIONS FOR SANCTIONS

Plaintiff has filed two motions for sanctions against the Consulting
Defendants and Mr. Harris.6 In support of these motions, Ptaintiff asserts that the

Consulting Defendants and Mr. Harris provided the Court with false inJormation

in the Consulting Defendants' motion to dismiss.

5

One of these filings is styled as a "REQUEST FOR NOTICE OF MOTION FOR
SANCTION" [Doc. No. 92. 1]. The Court construes this filing as the first of two motions for
sanctions filed against the Consulting Defendants and Mr. Harris.
-15-
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The Consulting Defendans state in their motion to dismiss that they "were

hired in 2005 by Defendant Varon to complete engineering design plans for an
Extension to the Medical Design Building located at 2885 Candler Road, Decatur,
Georgia 30034" [Doc. No.49-L,3]. In his response to several motions to dismiss,

Plaintiff attaches as an exhibit an appraisal of the 2855 Candler Road property
performed by Weibel

&

Associates, Inc. that

is dated September 7, 2004 (the

"appraisal plan") [Doc. No. 7L-1, 6]. Included within the appraisal plan is a
"Building Plan" provided by Consulting Enterprises Corporation [ld. at 9]. Based on
the fact that the appraisal plan is dated September7,2004, Plaintiff appears to assert

that the Consulting Defendants and Mr. Harris, by stating the Consulting
Defendants were hired to complete engineering plans on the 2855 Candler Road

property in 2005, perpetrated a type of fraud on the Court.
The undersigned clarifies that the appraisal plan does not contradict the

Consulting Defendants' motion to dismiss. As best as the undersigned can
determine, Plaintiff argues that the Consulting Defendants improperly assert in their

motion to dismiss that their first work regarding the 2855 Candler property was
performed in 2005. However, the Consulting Defendants make no such assertion in
their motion to dismiss. Again, the Consulting Defendants state in their motion to

-1,6-
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dismiss that they were hired to completeen gineering designplansonthe2855 Candler
Road property in 2005. This statement is in no way contradicted by the fact that the

Consulting Defendants also previously did appraisal work on the 2855 Candler
property n2004.In short, Plaintiff's contradiction argument is without merit.
It further appears that Plaintiff argues the Consulting Defendants perpetrated

fraud by not revealing the fact that it had done appraisal work on the 2855 Candler

property in 2004. This argument also fails, as the Consulting Defendants had no
such obligation. In filing its motion to dismiss, the Consulting Defendants were only

obligated to assert facts and arguments relevant to Plaintiff's complaint and their
arguments for dismissal. Plaintiff does not provide a valid argument that any

portion of the Consulting Defendants' motion to dismiss is contradicted or
invalidated by the fact that the Consulting Defendants performed appraisal work
on the 2855 Candler property prior to 2005.
In summary, through his motions for sanctions, Plaintiff attempts to create a
controversy where none exists. The Consulting Defendants' motion to dismiss

is

not

contradicted by the fact that they did appraisal work on the 2855 Candler property

prior to 2005. Further, Plaintiff does not present a valid argument that this factual
detail is relevant to his claims or in any way negates an argument maintained in the

-77-
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Consulting Defendants' motion to dismiss. In short, the Consulting Defendants had
no obligation to disclose this fact in their motion to dismiss. Accordingly, Plaintiff's
Request for Notice of Motion for Sanction [Doc. No. 921 and Plaintiffs' Motion for
Sanctions [Doc. No. 111] are hereby DENIED.

V.

ADDITIONALMOTIONS
As explained supra, the motions to dismiss filed in this action are hereby

granted. Therefore, every Defendant who filed one of these motions is dismissed

from this action. As a result of their dismissal, the remaining motions in this action
regarding these Defendants are rendered moot. Accordingly, for the sake of clarity

in the record, Plaintiffs' Motion for

Extension

of Time to File

Response to

Defendants' Motion to Dismiss [Doc. No. 60], Google Inc.'s, the BB&T Defendants',
the Consulting Defendants', the Weibel Defendants', T. Matthew Mashbum's, Stites

& Harbison, PLLC's,James P. Blum,Jr.'s, Beloin, Brown, Blum, LLC's, Cathy Lyon's,

and Amy Abrames' Joint Motion for Status ConJerence [Doc. No.

91.],

Google Inc.'s

Motion for Leave to File Sur-Reply [Doc. No. 109], the Consulting Defendants'
Motion to Stay [Doc. No. 115], the Weibel Defendants' Motion to Strike Plaintiffs'
Sur-Reply [Doc. No. 116], Google lnc.'s Motion to Strike Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment [Doc. No. 119], JudgeCynthia D. Wright's Motionfor Extension

-18-
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of Time to Respond to Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment [Doc. No.
120], the Consulting Defendants' Motion to Strike Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment [Doc. No. 130], Cathy Lyon's and Amy Abrames' Motion for

a Stay of the Deadline to Respond to Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment [Doc. No. 131], the Consulting Defendants' Motion Pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d) [Doc. No. 134], and Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File
Excess Pages [Doc. No. 1421 are hereby

VI.

DISMISSED AS MOOT.

CONCLUSION
For the above stated reasons, the BB&T Defendants' Motion to Dismiss [Doc.

No. 33], T. Matthew Mashburn s and Stites & Harbison, PLLC's Motion to Dismiss

[Doc. No. 45], James P. Blum, Jr.'s and Beloiru Brown, Blum, LLC's Motion to
Dismiss [Doc. No. 46l,JudgeCynthia D. Wright's Motion to Dismiss [Doc. No.47],
the Consulting Defendants' Motion to Dismiss [Doc. No.49], Google Inc.'s Motion

to Dismiss [Doc. No. 53], the Weibel Defendants' Motion to Dismiss [Doc. No. 56],

Cathy Lyon's and Amy Abrames' Motion to Dismiss [Doc. No. 58], Gil Chaim
Varon's, the Law Office of Gil Chaim Varory LLC's and Highshore Medical Center,
LLC's Motion to Dismiss [Doc. No. 65], and Darryl Moss'and Weissman, Nowack,

-19-
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Curry & Wilco, P.C.'s Motion to Dismiss [Doc. No. 67], to the extent they seek
dismissal of Plaintiffs complaint, are hereby GRANTED.
The Weibel Defendants' Motion forSanctions [Doc. No. 99], Plaintiff's Request

for Notice of Motion for Sanction [Doc. No. 92], and Plaintiffs' Motion for Sanctions
[Doc. No. 111] are hereby DENIED.

Plaintiffs' Motion for Extension of Time to File Response to Defendants'

Motion to Dismiss [Doc. No. 60], Google Inc.'s, the BB&T Defendants', the
Consulting Defendants', the Weibel Defendants', T. Matthew Mashbum's, Stites &
Harbison, PLLC's, James P. Blum, Jr.'s, Beloin, Brown, Blum, LLC's, Cathy Lyon s,
and Amy Abrames' Joint Motion for Status Conference [Doc. No. 91], Google Inc.'s

Motion for Leave to File Sur-Reply [Doc. No. 109], the Consulting Defendants'
Motion to Stay [Doc. No. 115], the Weibel Defendants' Motion to Strike Plaintiffs'
Sur-Reply IDoc. No. 116], Google Inc.'s Motion to Strike Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial

SummaryJudgment [Doc. No. 1L9],JudgeCynthia D. Wright's Motionfor Extension
of Time to Respond to Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment [Doc. No.
120], the Consulting Defendants' Motion to Strike Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment [Doc. No. 130], Cathy Lyon s and Amy Abrames' Motion for
Stay of the Deadline to Respond to Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial SummaryJudgment
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[Doc. No.l3l],theConsultingDefendants MotionPursuanttoFederalRuleof

Civil

Procedure 56(d) [Doc. No. 134], and Plaintiffs Motion for leave to File Excess Pages

[Doc. No. 142] are hereby DISMISSED AS MOOT.

IT IS SO ORDERED, dris-8*dayfvtay,2014.

HONORABLE STEVE g. IONES
TJNITED STATES DIS'IRICT IUDGE
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